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Abstract—This paper consider a new secure communication
scene where a full-duplex transmitter (Alan) need to transmit
confidential information to a half-duplex receiver (Bob), with a
silent eavesdropper (Eve) that tries to eavesdrop the confidential
information. For realizing secure communication between Alan
and Bob, a novel two phases communication scheme is proposed:
in Phase 1, Alan and Bob send artificial noises (AN) simultane-
ously, while in Phase 2, Alan superimposes the AN received in
Phase 1 with its confidential signal and sends the mixed signal
to Bob. Since the mixed AN could degrade the SINR (Signal to
Interference and Noise Ratio) of Eve, but does not affect the SINR
of Bob, a secrecy capacity can be achieved. We also derive the
conditions that the secrecy capacity of the proposed scheme exists,
and analyze the secrecy outage probability under Rayleigh fading
channel. Numerical results show that the secrecy capacity is about
two times higher than without AN, even though in the proposed
scheme half of the time is used to transmit ANs, and the outage
probability is about five times lower than that without AN.
Index Terms—Physical-layer Security, Artificial Noise, Full-
duplex, Secrecy Capacity, Outage Probability
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, wireless
security is an important concern that is attracting increas-
ing interests from the community. Traditionally, the security
problem in wireless networks was mainly studied at higher
layers using key-based cryptographic methods. However, as
the computational capability of wireless devices grows rapidly,
perfect security can be hardly guaranteed with the key-based
solutions. Physical-layer communication security that was first
introduced by Shannon [1] emerges as an effective solution
for secure communications by exploiting the physical char-
acteristics of wireless channels. In [2], Wyner showed that
a transmitter can communicate to its receiver with perfect
secrecy from an information theoretic perspective, when the
eavesdropper channel (between the transmitter and the eaves-
dropper) is degraded with respect to the main channel (between
the transmitter and the receiver). Based on this result, various
methods have been proposed to improve secrecy capacity by
means of degrading the eavesdropper channel, and one im-
portant direction is to inject artificial noises (AN) to degrade
the eavesdropper channel, such as [3]–[10]. Specifically, the
confidential information is superimposed with some specially-
designed artificial noises, which can be canceled by the receiver
while remains an interference to the eavesdropper.
More specifically, in [3]–[6], the AN is a special signal
designed in the null space of the main channel, and is emit-
ted to interfere with the eavesdropper. That is, in [3]–[6],
the MIMO (Multiple-Input Multiple-Output) equipment and
the beamforming technology are needed, further, for playing
beamforming, CSI (Channel State Information must be known
by the node who playing beamforming. In [7], [8], the AN
generated by transmitter of friendly jammer is assumed pre-
known by the receiver but unknown by the eavesdropper.
Its means in [7], [8] the risk that the selected AN may be
eavesdropped by the eavesdropper is existing. Recently, full-
duplex technology has been incorporated to realize physical-
layer secrecy communication [9], [10], in which the authors
considered a scenario in which either the relay node or the
receiver has full-duplex communication ability. Thus, the relay
or receiver can receive the information signal and transmit AN
simultaneously to puzzle the eavesdropper, thus the AN-leakage
problem in [9], [10] can be avoided.
Different from [9], [10], this paper consider a new secure
communication scene where a full-duplex transmitter (Alan)
need to transmit confidential information to a half-duplex
receiver (Bob), with a silent eavesdropper (Eve) that tries to
eavesdrop the confidential information, and to the best of our
knowledge, there are no works have solved the problem that
how to realize the secrecy transmission from a full-duplex
transmitter to a half-duplex receiver without the help of relays.
It is worth noting that the above problem is based on practical
scene, for example, a full-duplex base station (BS) wants
to transmit confidential information to a user while prevents
other users from eavesdropping. To counter the above problem,
a novel two-phase communication scheme that utilizes the
advantages of full-duplex technology and AN is proposed: In
phase 1, the transmitter and receiver send artificial noise nA and
nB simultaneously (nA and nB are only knows by Alan and Bob
respectively), while in phase 2, Alan mixes the received signal
with the confidential signal and sends it to Bob, thanks for
full-duplex, the received signal in phase 1 at Alan is mainly
constituted by nB. After phase 2, because nB is known by
Bob, so Bob could cancel the AN from the received signal,
but the eavesdropper (Eve) only knows nB polluted by nA from
phase 1, so Eve could not cancel the AN from received signal,
then Eve must suffer more interference than Bob. We note that
throughout the whole transmission process, both CSI and the
artificial noise sent by Bob in phase 1 are not required by Alan,
Alan also does not need the assistance of helpers or relays and
does not need to perform beamforming, what Alan need to do,
is just only mix and forward. Although this scheme only uses
half times to transmission, but it still can prominent improve
the secrecy capacity and reduce the secrecy outage probability
than that without AN and full-duplex.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• We propose a new transmission scheme to realize secure
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communication from full-duplex transmitter to half-duplex
receiver. This scheme is simple to implement.
• We drive the conditions that positive secrecy capacity
of the proposed scheme exists, analyze the secrecy out-
age probability and the ergodic secrecy capacity under
Rayleigh fading channel.
The remainder of the letter is organized as follows: Section
II describes the considered system model and introduces the
proposed scheme. Section III analyzes the secrecy performance
of the proposed scheme and gives the secrecy capacity and
outage probability of the proposed scheme. Section IV presents
the numerical results and finally Section V concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THE PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents our system model and the proposed
secure communication scheme.
A. System Model
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless communication
system with three communication nodes: a full-duplex transmit-
ter (Alan), an intended receiver (Bob) with single-antenna and
a silent eavesdropper (Eve) with single-antenna. Alan need to
send confidential information to Bob, and Eve tries to eavesdrop
the information.
Fig. 1. The Considered Communication System.
Let h1 and h3 be the complex channel fading coefficient of
the main channel and the eavesdropper channel, respectively,
and h2 be the complex channel fading coefficient between
Bob and Eve. We assume that at the initial phase of secrecy
communication, all the channel coefficients are unknown to
Alan, Bob and Eve. Moreover, we assume the reciprocity of
the forward and backward channels and a block-fading channel
model where each channel coefficient remains unchanged for
the time slot duration of T seconds is assumed in this paper1.
Let the AWGN (Additive Gaussian White Noise) at each node
has the same power N0.
B. The Proposed Scheme
For guaranteeing the confidential information transmitted
from Alan to Bob, a two-phase communication scheme is
proposed.
Phase 1: In the first phase, which lasts for T/2 seconds, Bob
sends an artificial Gaussian noise
√
PBnB (note that nB is only
known by Bob) in which nB∼CN(0, 1) and PB is the transmit
1Here we make this assumption for the purpose of easy analysis. In fact,
the assumption of the reciprocity channel is not necessary. Bob could use the
proposed method same as Eve (as in Lemma 1 ) to cancel the interference
caused by the artificial generated by itself.
power of Bob. When Bob sends
√
PBnB, Alan synchronously
sends another artificial Gaussian noise
√
PAnA (note that nA is
only known by Alan) , in which nA∼CN(0, 1) and PA is the
transmit power of Alan.
After Phase 12, denote the signal received by Alan (Thanks
to the full-duplex ability, Alan can transmit and receive simul-
taneously.) and Eve by yA and yE1, respectively. We have:
yA = h1
√
PBnB +
√
λPAn0 + nA1, (1)
yE1 = h2
√
PBnB + h3
√
PAnA + nE1, (2)
where
√
λPAn0 is caused by the residual self-interference (RSI)
in which n0∼CN(0, 1) and λ = |hSI |2 is the RSI channel gain
of Alan, and indicates the self-interference (SI) cancellation
capability of Alan, where hSI is the RSI channel of Alan. Note
that RSI=0 denotes perfect cancellation capability. nA1 and nE1
are AWGN satisfying CN(0, N0), respectively.
Note that, the residual self-interfering channel gain λ is
determined by the applied SI cancellation algorithm. Here, we
consider the digital-domain cancellation, where hSI can be
presented as hSI = hSIc − hˆSIc where hSIc and hˆSIc are the
self-interfering channel and its estimate value, this allows λ to
be modeled as a constant value [11].
Phase 2: In the second phase, which lasts for T/2 seconds,
Alan superimposes the received signal yA with the information
signal
√
PssA, where sA∼CN(0, 1) is the confidential informa-
tion signal and Ps is the transmit power of sA. The mixed signal
is xA =
√
PssA + yA. Alan then add a pilot signal ahead of xA
and sent it to Bob(i.e., after Phase 2, h1 and h3 are known by
Bob and Eve, respectively). Denote the received signal at Bob
and Eve in Phase 2 by yB and yE2, respectively. We have:
yB = h1
√
PssA + h1h1
√
PBnB + h1
√
λPAn0 + h1nA1 + nB2, (3)
yE2 = h3
√
PssA+ h3h1
√
PBnB + h3
√
λPAn0+ h3nA1+nE2, (4)
where nB2 and nE2 are AWGN with variance N0.
Since
√
PBnB and h1 are known by Bob, Bob could cancel
the h1h1
√
PBnB term from yB easily. By contrast, it is difficult
for Eve to detect nB from yE1. Furthermore, h1 is unknown to
Eve.Thus, Eve could not cancel the h1h3
√
PBnB term in yE2.
Thus, Eve suffers more interference from ANs than Bob, and
the proposed two-phase transmission scheme achieves higher
secrecy capacity.
III. ANALYSIS ON SECRECY CAPACITY AND OUTAGE
PROBABILITY
We next analyze the secrecy capacity and outage probability
of the assumed Rayleigh block fading channel.
A. Capacity of the Main Channel
Recall that a pilot signal is transmitted in Phase 2, Bob and
Eve can estimate h1 and h3, respectively. For Bob, it knows√
PBnB and h1. From yB in (3), it can cancel the interference
caused by h1h1
√
PBnB and obtain yBS :
yBS = h1
√
PssA + h1
√
λPAn0 + h1nA1 + nB2. (5)
2For synchronizing, in phase 1, a pilot signal is added ahead
√
PBnB , so
after phase 1, Alan knows h1 and Eve knows h2.
Define g1=|h1 |2, g2=|h2 |2 and g3=|h3 |2 as the gain of the
three channels, respectively. The SINR of the main channel is:
SINRB =
g1Ps
g1λPA + g1N0 + N0
, (6)
and the channel capacity of Bob, CB, is3:
CB = log2(1 + SINRB). (7)
B. Capacity of the Eavesdropper Channel
The signals received by Eve in two phases are (2) and (4),
respectively. We assume Eve is smart enough and could use yE1
in (2) to reduce the interference in yE2 as much as possible.
For cancelling the interference, Eve multiplies yE1 with a
complex coefficient hx , then obtains hx yE1, and minus it from
yE2. After cancel the interference, the signal obtained by Eve
is :
yES = h3
√
PssA
+ h3h1
√
PBnB + h3
√
λPAn0 + h3nA1 + nE2︸                                                 ︷︷                                                 ︸
N
− hx
(
h2
√
PBnB + h3
√
PAnA + nE1
)
︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
hxyE1
.
(8)
As regarding to how hx is determined to maximize the SINR
of Eve, we have the following lemma:
Lemma 1: To achieve the highest SINR, Eve can select
h∗x =
PB |h1h2h3 |
g2PB + g3PA + N0
e(θ1+θ3−θ2)i (9)
in which θ1, θ2 and θ3 are the phases of h1, h2 and h3,
respectively.
Proof: For achieving the highest SINR, h∗x must be:
h∗x = argmax
hx
(
SINRyES
)
, (10)
in which
SINRyES =
g3Ps
Var
(
N − hx yE1
)︸                ︷︷                ︸
EN
, (11)
and we have
EN = |h3h1 − hxh2 |2PB + |hx |2g3PA + |hx |2N0
+ g3λPA + g3N0 + N0.
(12)
From (11), we have h∗x = argmin
hx
(EN). From (12), it is easy
to see that when the phase of h3h1 is equal to that of hxh2,
|h3h1 − hxh2 | is the smallest. That is, θ∗x = θ1 + θ3 − θ2.
After θ∗x is determined, we can write EN as:
EN = (g2PB + g3PA + N0) |hx |2 − 2 |h1 | |h2 | |h3 | PB |hx |
+ g1g3PB + g3λPA + g3N0 + N0,
(13)
which is a convex function of |hx | and it is easy to verify
that
h∗x  = PB |h1h2h3 |g2PB+g3PA+N0 .
Lemma 1 above gives out the value of hx to make the SINR
of Eve highest, but in our system, h1 (correspondingly g1) is
unknown for Eve, so Eve could not compute h∗x directly. Eve
could approximate achieve h∗x buy using exhaust method: firstly,
3In this paper, the bandwidth term in Shannon formula is ignored. That is,
the unit of capacity calculated in this paper is bit/Hz/second or bit/symbol.
Eve could set
hx  = 1 and exhaust θx to achieve θx = θ∗x =
θ1 + θ3 − θ2 makes EN smallest, secondly, Eve fixes θx = θ∗x =
θ1 + θ3 − θ2 and exhausts
hx  to achieve h∗x  = PB |h1h2h3 |g2PB+g3PA+N0
makes EN smallest. From the above exhaust method, we can
see that, if T is long enough and the exhaust step length is
small enough, Eve could achieve exact h∗x , because if T is long
enough, the sample variance of the received signal at Eve will
be almost equal to the real variance of the received signal, and
if the exhaust step length is small enough, Eve could achieve
exact h∗x obviously. In the remainder of this letter, we think the
exact h∗x can be achieved by Eve.
To ease expression, we define M as:
M =
P2Bg2g3
g2PB + g3PA + N0
, (14)
By submitting h∗x into (8), we get can the SINR of Eve:
SINRE =
g3Ps
g3λPA + g3N0 + N0 + g1g3PB − g1M , (15)
and the channel capacity is:
CE = log2(1 + SINRE ). (16)
C. Secrecy Capacity and Outage Probability
According to [2], the instantaneous secrecy capacity is:
CS = [CB − CE ]+
=
[
log2 (1 + SINRB) − log2 (1 + SINEE )
]+
.
(17)
For expressing clearly, we define Y = PB − M/g3 and Z =
λPA+N0. To achieve a expected secrecy rate Rs (i.e., CB−CE ≥
Rs), we require
1 + g1Psg1λPA+g1N0+N0
1 + g3Psg3λPA+g3N0+N0+g1g3PB−g1M
≥ 2Rs , (18)
After mathematical derivation, we can obtain:
g1 ≥ g1L (g2, g3, Rs) ∆= −B +
√
B2 − 4AC
2A
, (19)
where A =
(
1 − 2Rs ) YZ + YPs , B =(
1 − 2Rs ) (Z2 + ZN0/g3 + YN0 + ZPs ) + PsN0/g3 and
C =
(
1 − 2Rs ) (ZN0 + N20 /g3) − 2RsPsN0. The above
inequation is the condition that the proposed scheme could
achieve the target secrecy rate Rs .
We assume the channels are Rayleigh fading then calculate
the secrecy outage probability and ergodic secrecy capacity.
We write hj ∼ CN(0, σ2j ), j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, the PDF(Probability
Density Function)of gj, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} is
P(gj) = 1
σ2j Γ(1)
e
− gj
σ2
j , j ∈ {1, 2, 3} . (20)
The secrecy outage probability of the proposed scheme,
Pout (Rs) = P (g1 < g1L (g2, g3, Rs)), can be computed by
Pout (Rs) =∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ g1L (g2,g3,Rs )
0 e
− g1
σ21 e
− g2
σ22 e
− g3
σ23 1
σ21σ
2
2σ
2
3
dg1dg2dg3,
(21)
and the ergodic secrecy capacity is
E(CS) =
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
g1L (g2,g3,0)
e
− g1
σ21 e
− g2
σ22 e
− g3
σ23 •
1
σ21σ
2
2σ
2
3
CS(g1, g2, g3)dg1dg2dg3.
(22)
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Fig. 2. Secrecy capacity versus Ps ,with different g2, in which PA = PB =
200, g1 = 0.4 and g3 = 0.6.
Fig. 3. Secrecy capacity versus PA and PB , in which g1 = 0.4, g2 = 0.4, g3 =
0.6, and Ps = 200.
where CS(g1, g2, g3) is a function of CS about g1, g2, and g3
given in (17).
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
This section presents numerical results to evaluate the per-
formance of the proposed scheme. Fig. 2 shows the numerical
results of secrecy capacity with different Ps , where PA = PB =
200, g1 = 0.4, g3 = 0.6, N0 = 1 and λ = 0.0001. Since the
channel fading is given and g1 < g3 , the secrecy capacity
with no full-duplex and AN is always zero. By contrast, our
proposed scheme can achieve positive secrecy capacity and the
outage probability is zero. As shown in Fig. 2, the secrecy
capacity of the proposed scheme increases as Ps increases. As
g2 increases, the achieved secrecy capacity decreases. That is
because as g2 increases, Eve could obtain more accurate nB
from (2), then could cancel the noise term h3h1
√
PBnB in (4)
more effectively.
Fig. 3 presents the numerical results of secrecy capacity with
different PA and PB, where Ps = 200, g1 = 0.4, g2 = 0.7, g3 =
0.6, N0 = 1 and λ = 0.0001. As can be seen, as PA and PB
increase, the secrecy capacity increases. That is because as the
power of AN increases, Eve suffers from more interference.
For fading channels, we assume hj ∼ CN(0, 1), j ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and the other parameters are same as Fig. 2. Fig. 4 presents the
secrecy capacities of the proposed scheme. Note that the ergodic
secrecy capacity given by (22) is multiplied with 0.5 because
half of the time is used to transmit ANs. As shown in Fig. 4, the
proposed scheme achieves much higher secrecy capacity than
the scheme without AN, even though in the proposed scheme
half of the time is used to transmit random signals. On the other
hand, as λ increases, the ergodic secrecy capacity decreases,
since a larger λ corresponds to a severe residual noise caused
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Fig. 5. Outage Probability versus Transmit power of ANs.
by PA in Alan’s full-duplex transmission. It is natural to see
that more effective SI cancellation gives higher ergodic secrecy
capacity. Also, in Fig. 4 if SI cancellation is bad, and the Ps is
small, the proposed scheme is worse than without AN, that is
because the ratio of the noise caused by SI to Ps is much bigger,
but as long as the Ps is not to small, the proposed scheme is
still batter then without AN.
Fig. 5 shows the outage probability, where Ps = 400, PA =
PB = PAN and the other parameters are same as Fig. 3 used.
As the target secrecy rate Rs increases, the outage probability
increases, but in our scheme, the outage probability is still lower
than without AN. Also as the power of AN, PAN , increases,
the outage probability decreases, that is because the interference
caused by AN at Eve become more effective.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We proposed a two-phase transmission scheme to guarantee
secrecy information transmission from a full-duplex source to a
half-duplex destination. We analyzed the secrecy capacity of the
proposed scheme, and presented the conditions for the proposed
scheme to achieve positive secrecy capacity. Numerical results
showed that the proposed scheme can obtain good performance
in terms of both secrecy capacity and outage probability. In
this paper, we assume all the ANs are transmitted with the
same power. As a future work, we will investigate the power
allocation algorithm of ANs and the secrecy performance of
the proposed scheme could be further improved.
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